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RELIGION-BASED ARGUMENTS IN THE PUBLIC
ARENA: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE ON
EUTHANASIA, COMPASSION1ND YENG v. STATE OF
WASINGTON AND QUILL v. VACCO.
PatriciaL. Rizzo*

INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, using religion-based arguments to shape
mainstream public morals and legal opinions can be a startling notion.
Yet, perhaps the idea is no more startling than the now common practice
of bringing personal morals into the realm of public debate. It is even
possible that introducing religious opinions into the purview of legislators
and judges, may induce both courts and lawmakers to employ religionbased morality to aid in the nearly impossible task of defining public
morals.
THE RELIGIOUS AND MEDICAL
ROAD TO EUTHANASIA
In the last two decades, public moral debate has been focused heavily on
the issue of a woman's right to privacy, in particular a woman's personal
choice to seek an abortion. With this right now clearly established and
defined under law, a new area of evolving moral questioning is whether,
and when, a person may take his or her own life and have others assist in
that process. As in the abortion debate, numerous religious entities have
expressed opinions on this subject," based upon principles of faith that
either support or attack the concept of a right to end one!s life. The
Roman Catholic Church is one such entity expressing its views concerning
euthanasia based on a highly developed theology.
In contrast to its much publicized stance against abortion, the Catholic
Church's position regarding euthanasia is more than "simple opposition.'
Rather, the Church has a sophisticated moral argument which, while
*Associate, Yannacone, Fay, Baldo &Daly, Media, PA. A.B., Bryn Ma%%t College, 1977; JJD.,
Temple University School of Law, 1980; M.A., VillaNova University, 1996.
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staunchly opposed to the deliberate ending of life, nonetheless recognizes
the realities of pain associated with a terminal illness, the inability of
medicine to always heal, and the inevitability of death. Support for this
proposition which is rooted in centuries-old Catholic moral theology,
carries merit for anyone who supports life and does not requite adherence
to all Catholic thought. Utilization of Catholic-based theory does,
however, require tolerance by those who traditionally have been opposed
to Catholic teachings. Only by taking the time to give the theory genuine
consideration, rather than immediately rejecting it based upon.its Catholic
identity, can its intellectual merits be appreciated.
Although articulated most prominently by the Roman Catholic
Church, the fundamental belief that all life is sacred is shared by believers
and non-believers worldwide. As the Sacred Congregalion for the
Doctrine of the Faith wrote in the Vatican Declarationon Euthanasia,
"Most people regard life as something sacred and hold that no one may
dispose of it at will, but believers see in life something greater, namely a
gift of God's love, which they are called upon to preserve and make
fruitful.' The Church has consistently promoted this ancient teaching.
For example in Evangelium Vitae,2 a recent encyclical letter, Pope John
Paul H reiterated the Church's opposition to all practices and beliefs that
denounce the sacredness of human life, including euthanasia.
Euthanasia, from the Greek for "easy death," or "good death,"3 has
come to mean, among other things, the deliberate ending of a human life
when a person is suffering from intense, incurable pain, and/or is at the
end stage of a terminal illness. For some, the spectacle of such suffering
demands that the human spirit be honored by offering a way to end the
pain, which may be achieved by ending the life. For others, who believe
not only in the sanctity of life but in God as the creator of that sanctity, it
is never appropriate to stand in God's stead and direct the ending of a life.
Supporters of both positions have attempted to secure judicial and
legislative approval of their views.
SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAnI, VATICAN DiCLARATION ON
EUTHANASIA (1980) reprinted in KEI D. O'ROURKE & PimLP BOYLE, MEJICAL ETHICS SOURCES OF CATHOLIC TIACH[NGS (1989).
2 Pope John Paul II, TiE GOSPEL OFLIPE (EVANGELRM vrrAE): (1995).
3 ROBEELTN. WENNBERG, TauNAL CHOICES 3 (1989).
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In response to the public debate on euthanasia, the Church has drafted
several documents that explain its moral theology Although originally
intended for a primarily Catholic audience, these treatises and articles can
have value in the ongoing public conversation about the right to die. The
Church's view does not interpret the sanctity of life as demanding a
tenacious hold to human life once the irreversible process of dying has
begun. Instead, the Roman Catholic Church teaches that futile treatments
need not be endured and medicines that ease pain, even those that may
unintentionally hasten death, may be administered. Such practices are not
considered euthanasia but simply aelmowledgments of life's natural end.
Proponents of euthanasia, which is also referred to as "physicianassisted suicide," have at times attempted to link Church-sanctioned
natural termination of life with their own agendas by claiming that the
decision to refuse or halt treatment may speed up death as readily as does
administration of a lethal dose of prescription drugs. This argument,
however, has little merit because the Church's definition of euthanasia is
to "dictate the ending of a life," and as opponents of euthanasia have
noted, "a bright line exists between allowing nature to take its course by
refusing medical treatment and taking active measures to terminate life.
The former decision may or may not involve an intent to end life, while
the latter always will."
The prominence of the euthanasia discussion today is a direct result of
the advanced state of medical science and its capacity to keep patients
alive. Since the 1970s, it has been common medical practice inthe United
States to provide patients with everything medical technology has to
offer.6 Consequently, decisions regarding the appropriateness of a
particular treatment have, in the past, often been made by the patient's

4 See SACRED CONGREaATIONFORTHEDOCIRINE OFTHEFAITmi .pra note ], at 109; Letter

from Pope John Paul 1I, supra note 2; U.S. Bishops, EthFicalandReligiousDrcctiesforCalolic
Health CareServices, reprintedin 24 ORIGINS 456 (1994).
- James Bopp, Jr., and Richard ].Coleson, The Constitutional Case Against Permitting
Physician-Assisted Suicide for Competent Adults with "Terminal Conditions," II IssuEs INLAW

&MED. 253, (1995).
6 Tmo'Y E.Quimt,
29(1993).

D., DEATH AND DiG~rr: IAmNG CHOICES Aim TA=n;G CIARGE
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physician rather than the patient or their family.7 In response to this
situation as well as a combination of financial and ethical con.traints, the
concept of "medical futility" began to grow in significance. This theory
recognizes that when treatment is medically futile, the ultimate decision
regarding treatment should be made by the patient8 who can choose either
to continue the ineffective treatment, or to forego treatment and endure
imminent and naturally occurring death.
As medicine has been able to offer more and more treatments to the
dying, it has become evident that technology in many cases has not been
extending life, but merely lengthening the process of dying. To address
the concern created by medical futility, some health care providers
introduced the concept of pain management and basic needs care, as
opposed to more aggressive treatment. Also known as "palliative care,"
"comfort care," or "hospice care," this form of patient care acknowledges
that patient recovery is not possible, and concentrates instead on providing
pain relief as well as social, spiritual, and psychological well-being. 9
The use of hospices and hospice-type care has been challenged,
however, by critics who believe palliative care is instufficient to
demonstrate respect for the dying; instead, these critics demand the right
to end the life of the sufferer. More recently, this view has been expanded
to include not only access to euthanasia, but assistance of the medical
community in performing the final act.

Two recent federal appeals court decisions addressed this demand for
medical assistance in dying. In Compassion In Dying v. The State of
Washington, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
using reasoning derived from abortion right cases, found a constitutional
right to die by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."0 In Quill v. Vacco, a factually similar case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned a district court

7Id.

' Renee C. Fox, TheEnty ofUS. Bioethics into the 1990's, in AMATEROFPPJNCIPLES 35-36
(1994).

- QUILL, supranote 6, at 23.
10Compassion In Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. granted,
116 S.Ct. 37 (1996).
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decision denying the right to die,"1 and instead found a constitutional right
to die in the Equal Protection Clause." On October 1, 1996, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted petitions for writs of certiorari in both
these cases, and after briefing arguments in tandem, the cases were heard
in January 1997.
DEFINING EUTHANASIA
Euthanasia is a word with many definitions. For example, the American
Medical Association (AMA) defines euthanasia as "administration of a
lethal agent in order to relieve a patients intolerable and untreatable
suffering." 13 According to the Catholic Church's Vatican Declarationon
Euthanasia,euthanasia is "an action or omission which of itself or by
intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be
eliminated.' ' 4 The Church's reference to euthanasia is found, "in the
intention of the will and in the methods used."' 5 Consequently, for the
Church, euthanasia is not defined by the mere administration of comfort
care, the cessation or refusal of extraordinary medical treatment, or even
the administration of pain medication which may in fact shorten life.
Instead, the Church's definition requires an intent to end the life.16
In the legal world, euthanasia has been defined as "the act or practice
of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable and
distressing disease, as an act of mercy. ' 17 Under this definition, it is not
necessary that the patient be dying before "mercy death" can be utilized.
To compound the confusion, euthanasia is often further divided into subtypes. For example, six categories of euthanasia have been identified:

" See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
12 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted,117 S.Ct. 36 (1996).
"T.Howard Stone and William L Winslade, Plosician-AssistedSuicide andEuthanasiain
the UnitedStates, 16 L OFLEr.m. 481,483 (1995).
14 SACRED CONGREGATIONFORT EDo 'RIHNEOFTHEFrni, supranote 1, at 110.
isId
16 PONTICAL COUNCIL CORUNUM-QUESONS OFEiBCS REGawINGTHEFATALLY ILLAND
im DYING, (1981) reprintedin KEVN D. O'ROURKE & PHILIP BOYLE, MEDICAL ETHIcs SOURCES OFCATHOLICTEACHINGS 114 (1989).

17 BLACK'S LAW DIciONARY 554(6th ed. 1990).
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(1) passive euthanasia, or failure to treat the patient with any
extraordinary measures;
(2) semi-passive euthanasia, involving the cessation of treatment already
begun;
(3) semi-active euthanasia, the actual disconnection of a patient from a
respirator;
(4) accidental or "double effect" euthanasia, resulting from administration
of pain medication with a second, unintended effect of causing death;
(5) suicide or physician-assisted suicide conducted by the patient herself,
or with a prescription provided by a physician who allows, the patient
to consume a lethal dose of drugs; and
(6) active euthanasia involving death by lethal drugs administered by a
physician."8
In addition, further distinctions can be made between "voluntary" and
"involuntary" euthanasia. Voluntary euthanasia has been defined as
"allowing the physician to take final action that brings on. a patient's
death."' 9 The decision to die in this instance emanates from. the patient
and no one else? In contrast, most consider involuntary euthanasia to be
murder, 21 because the decision to end the terminally ill patient's life is
made against the wishes or without the knowledge of the patient.2 2
For the Church, inclusion of "refusal" or "cessation" of treatment in
the definition of euthanasia is problematic and forces the issue to be
focused upon intent. According to Catholic moral teaching, unless the
actual intent to end a person's life is present, euthanasia has not occurred.
Others disagree and find that where death is produced, whether intended
or not,euthanasia has occurred. 3 The Church, and those who follow its
line of reasoning, have countered this argtment with the theory of "double

Is

See It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988) (anonymous letter describing physicianauthor's administration of lethal dose of morphine to patient in great distress: and dying of
incurable ovarian cancer who asked that death be advanced).
19Jerald G. Bachman, et al,Attitudes ofMichiganPhysiciansandthe PublicToward Legalizing
Physician-AssistedSuicide and VoluntaryEuthanasia,334 NEW ENG J. MED. 305 (1996).
20 QUILL, supranote 6, at 142.
21 WENNBERG, supranote 3, at 9.
'1 QUILL, supranote 6, at 142.
23 Id at 144.
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effect," which proposes that there is amoral distinction between intending
evil and having evil result, or merely permitting evil to occur as a byproduct of the good effect.24 By employing this principle, the Church has
concluded that it is licit to perform an action which has good and bad
effects provided that the action itself is not morally bad; that the evil effect
is sincerely not desired, but merely tolerated; that the evil is not the means
of obtaining the good; and that the good effect is sufficiently important to
balance or outweigh the harmful effect.
Proponents of euthanasia have also categorized various modes of
ending a human life, finding some forms to be euthanasia and others not.
This reluctance on the part of euthanasia defenders to outright label
activities as "euthanasia!' may stem from the fact that many people,
although fundamentally in favor of the right to choose the time of one's
own death, nonetheless regard the term euthanasia as implying an
involuntary process. For example, "physician-assisted suicide" is a term
that means the patient performs the actual final act, but is assisted by a
physician. Typically this involves the patient's consumption of lethal
drugs prescribed by a physician.26 The right to this particular mode of
suicide was recently upheld both in CompassionIn Dying and Qll.27
Other terms used to describe the intentional ending of a life include
"physician-aid-in-dying" and "physician-assisted death," which not only
include suicide, but also include active participation by the physician who
may administer a lethal dose to the patient. In this scenario,
administration of a lethal dose of medication would not necessarily be
limited to the terminally il.28
Finally, some additional definitions that are imperative to consider in
this discussion, focus on the meaning of the term "death," and what
constitutes extraordinary and ordinary treatments. The Church, for its
part, has defined "death" as occurring when a person"has irreversibly lost
24 William May, Double Effect, in.
1978).

Encyclopedia of Bioethics

(W. Pxeich ed.

2 GERALD KELLY, MEDICO-MORALPROBLE-MS 129 (1958).
• QUILL, supranote 6, at 159.
See Compassion InDying v. Washington, 79 F3d 790, 833 (9th Cir. 1996); Quill v. Vacco,
S
80 F.3d 716,727 (2d Cir. 1996).
2' Franklin G. Miller et al, RegulatingPlystcan-4ssistedDeath,331 NEW ENG. IME. 120
(1994).
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all capacity to integrate and coordinate the physical and mental functions
of the body." Thus, death occurs when: the spontaneous cardiac and
respiratory functions have definitively ceased; or an irreversible cessation
of every brain function is verified.29 Where a patient is in a permanent
coma, there is no obligation to provide treatment other than comfort care.
However, if it can be established. clinically that there exists a possibility
of recovery, then there is an obligation to provide medical trez.atment.3 In
contrast to this definition, a 1968 Harvard Medical School commission
defined death as the lack of brain waves, as reflected by an
electroencephalogram (EEG).3 While the Church's definition of death
seems to require an absolute guarantee of the impossibility of recovery,
the Harvard definition gives greater confidence to a single, albeit
extremely significant, indicator.
In attempting to define what constitutes "treatment," United States
Catholic bishops have recently reasoned that:
while every person is obliged to use ordinary means to preserve his
or her health, no person should be obliged to submit to a health care
procedure that the person has judged ...
not to provide a reasonable
hope of benefit without imposing excessive risks and burdens on the
32
patient or excessive expense to family or community.
Clearly, not every means available need be considered in determining
which medical procedures to pursue. Rather, an analysis is called for to
identify the particular treatments that have a reasonable chance of
improving the patient's condition, and those which are either useless or too
burdensome to endure. The inclusion of "expense" as an element of
consideration is a recent addition to the equation, and reflects the Church's
awareness of how this factor all too often figures into decisions regarding
medical treatment.
29

THE CHURCHES SPEAK ON: EuTHANASIA 20

(J. Gordon Melton ed., 1985).

PONInFCALACADEMYOF SCiENCES REPORT ON PROLONGING LIFE AND DmRmNiNG DEATH
(1985), reprintedin KEVIN D. O'RoutRE & PHmIP BOYLE, MEDICAL ETICS - SOURCES OF
30

CATHoLIcTEAcHINGs 67 (1985).

31 SUICIDEANDEUIHANASIA: THERGHTs OFPESONHOOD 7 ( Samuel E. Vallace and Albin
Eser eds., 1981).
11 U.S. Bishops, EthicalandReligiousDirectivesfor CatholicHealth Care Sen ices, reprinted
in 24 ORIGINs 456 (1994).
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As an alternative to the benefits/burdens analysis, at least one
commentator, Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey, has advocated use of a
"medical indications" policy in which only those treatments that are
"medically indicated" for the patient are considered to be "ordinary." All
other treatments are considered "extraordinary" and can in good
conscience be refused?3 Employing logic compatible with the Church's
teachings, Ramsey has argued that once it is established that a person is
dying and there is no hope of recovery, no treatment is medically
indicated."
Although the Church usually requires that comfort care be extended
even when recovery is medically impossible, arguments based on Catholic
moral teaching have been expanded in certain situations so that even
hydration and nutrition may be deemed "extraordinary" and can morally
be ended. 35 This movement in what has essentially been a firm position,
is due no doubt in part to the controversial cases of Karen Quinlan and
Nancy Cruzan who each had their dying process agonizingly prolonged,
in part through the simple measure ofproviding nutrition and liquids.
Although this is merely a small sample of the variety of definitions of
euthanasia and related terms in use throughout the medical, legal and
ethical communities, it is obvious that uniformity of definitions is lacking.
Universally agreed upon terminology would greatly facilitate not only
debate and legislation, but ultimately, patient care. For example, those
who support the right to end one's life have largely ignored the distinction
that exists between using euthanasia in order to kill; physician-assisted
suicide; and allowing death to occur naturally through cessation of
medically futile treatments.
Ironically, these same supporters also cling to a fabricated distinction
between physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, although the result is
identical in bringing about the patient's death through intentional means,
either by the patient's own hand or that of her physician. 'Whenever the
life of the patient is cut short through administration of drugs designed
"3 PALRAMSEY, EHICSATTHEEDGEOFLIFE 156-157, 188 (1978).

3'Id at 268.

35 CARDimAL IOSEHBmmniANADDR ssTo'I'mCemFoRCLi 'icALI licALETmcs

(1988) reprintedin THE CHuaCHES SPEAK ON: EtrHANAsrA 20, 29 (J. Gordon Melton, ed. 1985).
11 See In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (NJ. 1975), cart. denied,97 S.CT. 319 (1976); Cnizan v.
Director, M0. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, cert. granted, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
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exclusively to end the life, and is not allowed to come to its natural
termination, it is "euthanasia." Consequently, any concept of "passive"
euthanasia is false, as there can be nothing passive about choosing to
terminate a life. Instead, the term "euthanasia" should be applied to all
procedures that are intended to cause death, and should not be extended
to those instances in which a natural death is allowed to occur.3"
PUBLIC MORALS AND THE LAW
Since the early 1980s, there has been an ongoing public conversation
about euthanasia and the individual's right to make decisions regarding
medical treatment, including the right to end one!s life. In a now famous
article entitled, "It's Over, Debbie," published in January 1988 in the
Journalof the American Medical Association (JAMA), an anonymous
resident confessed to his alleged administration of lethal drugs to a young,
terminally ill cancer patient in order to end her uncontrollable pain. The
piece drew considerable comment and criticism against the editorial board
of JAMA for printing the controversial and potentially unverified article,
thereby tacitly implying its approval of the physician's actions. JAMA
countered these accusations by stating that the purpose of the article was
38
to stimulate debate about euthanasia.
In 1990, Congress responded to public concern about the right to die
by passing "The Patient Self-Determination Act,"39 under which all

health-care facilities receiving Medicaid or Medicare subsidies are
required to ask each patient on admission whether an advance directive
has been completed. Each facility must now advise patient3 of its own
policies regarding the honoring of advance directives, as well of the
patient's right to refuse treatment.4"

"7Marcel Gervais, Report of Testimony Before CanadianSenate's Committee on Assisted

Suicide andEuthanasia-Oct.26,1994,24 ORIGINS 394 (1994). Paul Ramsey concurred with this
reasoning in establishing a dichotomy between "dying well," which involves choosing death, and
what he termed, "dying well enough," which is never a choosing of death, but rathc:r an acceptance
of it at its natural time.
It's Over Debbie,supranote 18, at 2142.
"Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 115, 205 (codified
's

as amended in scattered paragraphs of 42 U.S.C. § 1395).
40 QUILL, supranote 6, at 189.
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Physicians and other health-care professionals have also expressed
support for the participation of caregivers in euthanasia. For example, an
article by a group of phyicians published in the New EnglandJournalof
Medicine, stated that physician assistance in committing euthanasia,
"serves the moral goals of relief of suffering and self-determination on the
part of patients." 41 The physicians concluded that they "... regard
physician-assisted death as a non-standard medical practice reserved for
extraordinary circumstances, when it is requested voluntarily by a patient
whose suffering has become intolerable and who has no other satisfactory
options. ' While this group of physicians held that comfort care should
be the standard treatment for dying patients, they nonetheless saw a place
for euthanasia and would not limit it to the terminally ill, but would
include those with "incurable debilitating illnesses."43
In Michigan and Oregon, two states with active advocates of
euthanasia, recent polls revealed that the medical communities in each
state are to some extent favorably disposed toward euthanasia, even when
it includes physician participation. According to the 1994-1995 Michigan
poll, the majority of physicians surveyed favored legalization of
euthanasia, or at least maintaining the status quo ofnot openly permitting
euthanasia but also not attaching criminal liability to physicians who assist
in patient suicide.O
The Oregon poll was most likely prompted by the November 1994
passage of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act,45 which allowed
physicians to legally assist in patient suicides. In August 1995, however,
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon found the Act
unconstitutional, because it denied terminally ill patients the same
protection that exists for the rest of the population. 4 The District Court
decision was subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals

"I Miller, supra note 28, at 119.
42

Id

43

Id at 120.

Bachman, supranote 19, at 303.
4s OR. LAWS 1995, ch. 3, § 1.01.
41 Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
'"
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for the Ninth Circuit, which issued an injunction on the Act that remains
in effect pending its ruling.4 7
The Oregon poll, completed in 1995, indicated that 60 percent of
physicians believe physician-assisted suicide should be legal in some
cases. At least 48 percent of the physicians admitted they would be
willing to prescribe a lethal dose, while 31 percent stated they would be
unwilling to do so on moral grounds. 48 Another interesting slatistic which
emerged from this study was that half of the physicians polled were
uncertain what medication to prescribe to a patient that might be taken as
a lethal dose.49
In addition to physicians who support euthanasia, a large segment of
the general public has also become vocal on the issue. Some supporters
have echoed arguments that were made successfully in the abortion rights
arena, claiming that if a woman's right to control her own body includes
the right to have an abortion, "when that same woman at a later stage of
her life becomes terminally ill, her right to control her ow.a body must
include her right to make decisions about the voluntary termination of her
own life during the end stages of her terminal illness.'"5 If these
proponents ofthe "right to die" are correct, however, the right to end one's
own life and to have a physician's assistance cannot reasonably be limited
to the terminally ill. It is a right that would belong to anyone, at any
5
time. 1
The political and social environment surrounding euthanasia has
clearly been one of debate, although a growing sector of the population is
voicing its support for laws that de-criminalize suicide assistance or create
a positive right to seek and offer such aid. Into this debate have stepped
two federal appellate courts faced with the responsibility of crafting new
public morals that support the right to die.

I Lee v. Oregon, Nos. 95-35854, 95-35948,95-35949 (9th Cir.), argued July 9, 1996 (decision
pending).
49 Melinda A. Lee, et al, LegalkingAssistedSuicide - Views ofPhysicians in O.'cgon, 334 NEW
EN. L MED.313 (1996).
49 .1aJ

51 Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide Constitutional?ISay No, 72 U.
Dir. MERCY L. REV. 729 (1995).
51 Yale Kamisar, AgainstAssistedSuicide - Even A Very Limited Form,72 U. DET. M RcY L.
REv. 766 (1995).
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Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington
and Quill v. Vacco
In CompassionIn Dying v. The State of Washington,2the Ninth Circuit,
in an en banc decision, reversed its original panel and upheld the opinion
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
that had found a portion of Washington Statute 9A.36.060, that
criminalizes assistance given a person who attempts to commit suicide, to
be unconstitutional.- 3 In ConpassionIn Dying, a group of terminally ill
patients and their physicians, as wvell as "Compassion In Dying," an entity
that seeks the legal right to assist its members to commit suicide, brought
suit to overturn portions of the Washington law banning assisted suicide.
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit first defined the term
euthanasia as "the act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons
suffering from incurable and distressing disease, as an act of mercy, but
not at the person's request."54 Before beginning its analysis of the case,
the appeals court emphasized that it would focus upon whether a
constitutional right to die can be said to exist, rather than the narrower
issue of whether there exists a right to die with the assistance of a
physician.5 Nonetheless, because the court was compelled to reach its
decision within the confines of the particular facts of the case, it was also
forced to address specific physician-assistance issues.
Ultimately, not only did the Ninth Circuit find a constitutional right to
die, but it also found a constitutional right to die that consisted of having
a physician prescribe medication for the patient to self-administer.5 S For
the court, there was no problem accepting physician-assisted suicide,
which it interpreted as a logical extension of Washington law that already
permitted competent patients to refuse or to terminate treatmentYm The
court refused however, to find a right to other forms of euthanasia such as
physician-aid-in dying, where the physician not only prescribes the

s Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
See Compassion In Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
CompassionIn Dying, 79 F. 3d at 832i. 120.
.sId. at 8 01.
5

Id at 793.
Id at 817.
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medication but also administers the fatal dose s Similarly, the court also
found that disconnecting a respirator, ceasing nutrition or hydration, or
administering pain medication that has the "double effect' o f easing pain
and hastening death, are all means of intentionally causing death.59 As the
court held:
We see little, if any, difference for constitutional or ethical purposes
between providing medication with a double effect and providing
medication with a single effect as long as one of the known effects
in each ease is to hasten the end of the patient's life. Similarly, we
see no ethical or constitutionally cognizable difference bzween a
doctor's pulling the plug on a respirator and his prescribing drugs
which will permit a terminally ill patient to end his own life.' °
For the Compassion In Dying court to reach its conclusion, it was
initially necessary for the court to construct a definition of euthanasia that
encompassed involuntary euthanasia only, which is illegal everywhere in
the United States.6 The court then distanced itself from condoning such
activity, and sought instead to establish an artificial distinction between
a death resulting from a physician who merely prescribes a lethal
medication to a patient, and a physician who actually administers the
medication to a patient. Finally, the court negated a genuine distinction
between the intent to kill and the acceptance of death, by refusing to allow
for the "double-effect" principle in which medication needed to control
pain may unintentionally cause a quicker death. 62
The courtfs reluctance to acknowledge "intent" as a principal element
in identifying euthanasia is remarkable, as intent is a promaient concept
in both United States civil and criminaljurisprudence. For example in the
civil realm, intent is examined to determine if a tort constitutes mere
negligence, gross negligence, or wanton misconduct. Fines, penalties, and
jury awards differ significantly depending on the mode of malfeasance
found to exist. In the criminal setting, intent is of crucial importance and

58 Id.
9 Compassion

in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790,822 (9th Cir. 1996).

60Id. at 824.
61 Id at 832 n. 120.
6 Id. at 823.
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is used to differentiate among the degrees of murder and manslaughter, as
well as serving as a dividing line between felonies and misdemeanors.
Intent can also be the primary determinative in assessing a crime as a
capital offense. In short, intent is a concept utilized throughout the law,
and it is one the CompassionIn Dying court chose to ignore.
Instead, the majority opinion in CompassionIn Dying employed false
logic both by ignoring the element of intent and by declining to call
physician-assisted suicide "euthanasia" on the meaningless distinction that
the physician does not herself administer the deadly medications. This
incongruity was noted by Judge Beezer who wrote in his dissent6 3 "The
proper place to draw the line is between withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment... and physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia.... The former
is constitutionally protected the latter are not' ' 5
Despite the logic presented in the dissenting opinions in Compassion
in Dying, the majority chose to find a liberty interest in the right to die,
emanating from the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
based upon essentially the same reasoning employed by the United States
Supreme Court in finding a woman's right to choose to have an abortion.
While acknowledging the right ofthe state to preserve life, the court found
that once the right to die has been identified as a liberty interest, the statets
interest is substantially diminished when a competent adult no longer
wishes to continue living.6'
The reasoning employed by the majority in Compassionin IDying is
contrary to traditional Catholic moral thought in that it bypasses the
concept of the sanctity of life in favor of establishing a human-made right
to end life. The court also articulated the belief that greater value is
attached to some lives over others. In a powerfully-reasoned brief, the
United States Catholic Conference argued that the plaintiffst case was
essentially proposing that some individuals are better off dead than alive.P
This conference argued that such a conclusion could only be made by
those employing quality-of-life paternalism - the belief that the value of

Id.
at 840.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, 840 (9th Cir. 1996).
6s Id at 820.
65 Amicus Brief, United States Catholic Conference, in Support of Appellants, State of
Washington, filed July 11, 1994, at 29.
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a life is determined by those who surround it and communicate to the ill
or dying person that a life robbed of abilities is one devoid of meaning and
should be ended.
In Quill v. Vacco,67 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed a lower court opinion and reached the same result as
reached in CompassionIn Dying, but for a different and potentially more
significant reason. In Quill, a group of physicians joined with their
terminally ill patients to challenge New York statutes which criminalized
providing aid to a person committing suicide. The plaintiffi appealed a
summary judgment order entered on behalf of defendants by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, upholding the
constitutionality of the statutes.6" The plaintiffs argued that New York
Penal Law Sections 120.30 and 125.15 violated both their 1iba*rty interests
under the Due Process clause as well as their Equal Protection rights. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, declined to recognize the right
to die as a liberty interest and, instead, found a right of the competent,
terminally ill patient to choose to end his or her life in the Equal
Protection clause.
Following the reasoning of Compassion In Dying, the Quill court
explained that it would not decide the legality of euthanasia, which would
not be tolerated in the United States as it is in countries such as the
Netherlands. Rather, the court maintained that it would merely establish
whether the terminally ill are entitled to the assistance of a physician to
end their lives.69 As a result, the Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit,
refused to address the issue of "euthanasia," and by doing so avoided
confronting the core of the debate, namely the right to kill. Consequently,
for the Second Circuit, actual murder remains the only act that can be
called euthanasia.7"
By likening the administration of pain medication that inadvertently
shortens life with the prescription of drugs for the intentional and
exclusive purpose of ending life, the Quill majority revealed its refusal to
acknowledge intent behind the action as a means of determiaing what is

67
'

Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct 36 (1996).
See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

9 Quill,80 F.3d at 730-731.
70 IL
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and is not truly euthanasia. Similarly, by failing to distinguish between
suicide and the refusal or termination of certain treatments, the court also
tried to claim as supporters of euthanasia, proponents who believe in the
sanctity of life and yet acknowledge dying as a natural process that should
not necessarily be impeded by application of useless medical procedures l
Based upon the Second Circuit Court's understanding that the Equal
Protection clause demands that individuals similarly situated be treated in
a similar manner, the majority of the court held the state had no rational
basis for a law that treats certain competent and adult terminally ill
patients differently. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that in New
York a terminally ill patient who requires a respirator or other device or
procedure to live can opt to forgo the treatment and, thereby, advance the
event of her death. In contrast, a patient who is terminally ill but not
dependent on any device or treatment is forestalled from initiating any
"treatment" that may ultimately cause death.
Like CompassionIn Dying,the reasoning of the Quill court obliterates
examination of the intent involved in these two different situations. In the
first instance, a patient chooses to forego medical assistance that is not
keeping her alive so much as it is keeping her from death. In the second,
the patient chooses to deliberately challenge death by dictating the
moment of its arrival. In support of this distinction, it must be noted that
in the first example, if the patient is not terminal and if the respirator or
other treatment is actually providing a benefit to the patient, the deliberate
refusal to accept treatment would be contrary to moral reasoning
employed both by the Church, and others who respect the sanctity of life.
In that instance, the action of the patient would have to be described as
suicide.
Now that two appellate court decisions have individually found the
existence of a constitutional right to die, it seems appropriate that the
United States Supreme Court review this important public policy issue.
Ratification of the legal basis for the Quill decision is an even greater
concern for those opposed to euthanasia, because it requires greater
stretching of the Constitution than does an argument based on invention
of a "novel liberty interest." The current Supreme Court has in recent
71 Id

72 Id. at 729.
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years demonstrated reluctance to develop new fundamental rights.7 and
a right based on Equal Protection would stand on firmer ground and make

it more likely that a constitutional right to die becomes accepted as law of
the land.
Although the right to die is currently limited to the Second and Ninth
Circuits, the introduction of this right raises enormous issues for patients
and health-care professionals. For example, consider a hospital that does
not wish to honor a patient's request for assistance in committing suicide.
Alternatively, what if the patient making the request is too physically
weak to be transferred to another facility? Should a hospital accept a
patient who enters their facility for the exclusive purpose of committing
suicide? 74
Both CompassionIn Dying and Quill are limited in application to the
terminally ill. The process of stare decisis however, is such that prior
decisions form the foundation for new ones, which in turn arc enlarged to
support new facts. It is only a matter of time before CompassonIn Dying
and Quill are cited to support the legality of the actions of euthanizers
such as Jack Kevorkian.
What also remains unclear is how to define which individuals are
terminally ill. In the Oregon physician survey, half of the respondents did
not feel confident in predicting a patient's life expectancy, which under
Oregon law requires a maximum prediction of six months until death in
order to be considered "terminal."75 For jurisdictions governed by
CompassionIn Dying, an additional problem may be expected to surface
as individuals who are not terminally ill also seek the right to end their

" For example, inPlannedParenthoodv.Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), an abortion rights case
that considered the constitutionality of restrictions to the right to have an abolion enacted in
Pennsylvania, the Court reconsidered the continuing viability of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). In complex and struggling opinions, the plurality confirmed the central holdings ofRoc,
but without a strong articulation of the right to have an abortion as "fundamental." 505 U.S. at
844-869. With the exception ofJustice Blackmun's concurrence and dissent, 505 UIS. at 922-929,
the plurality's substantial focus is on the propriety of following stare decisis in reconsidering Roe,
not a ringing endorsement of the right to abortion as a fundamental right. In contrast, the four
dissenters actually termed the right as "non-fundamental," and completely subject to state
regulation.
I Amicus Briet Washington State Hospital Association and Catholic Health Association of the
United States, in Support of Appellants, State of Washington, filed July 11, 1994, at 8.
7S Lee, supranote 48, at 313.
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lives based on the argument for liberty and autonomy interests.
Consequently, if the right to end life is based on one's autonomy, a
patient's medical condition and motivation for seeking suicide become
irrelevant. 6
CATHOLIC MORAL THOUGHT IN PUBLIC DEBATE
In Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul ]I offered a response to the tangle of
issues surrounding euthanasia that to believers in the sanctity of life may
seem simple in its integration and consideration of the problem. To nonbelievers, it may appear only naively simplistic. John Paul unmasks
euthanasia as bringing a "gentle" death, and reveals it as a way to end a
life that has been judged useless and without value.O In repeating the
Catholic doctrine that a determination must be made regarding the
attendant improvement to the patient that may result from a treatment as
opposed to the burden the patient will be forced to endure, John Paul
affirmed the teaching that futile medical treatments do not have to be
initiated or continued in order to respect the sanctity of life. s Such a
consideration does not constitute euthanasia; instead, "it rather expresses
acceptance of the human condition in the face of death."7 9
Although Pope John Paul II has been a vigorous advocate of the
sanctity of life, and has been verbal in his condemnation of euthanasia, he
is but the latest in a long line of popes to take such an approach. Pope
Pius XI, referencing the form of euthanasia used by the Nazi regime,
wrote in Acta Apostolicae Sedis:
...
[W]e see at times the deformed, the insane and those suffering
from hereditary disease deprived oftheir lives, as though they were
a useless burden to society; and this procedure is hailed by some as
a manifestation of human progress, and as something that is entirely
in accordance with the common good. Yet who that is possessed of
sound judgment does not recognize that this not only violates the
71 MarkE. Chopko & Michael F. Mose, AssistedSutcide:Still a WonderfulLffc?, 70 NoTR
DAuEL. REV. 519,527 (1995).
'1 Pope John Paul I, supranote 2, n. 64.
7 Id. atn. 65.
'"

Id

262

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 1:243

natural and divine law written in the heart of every man, but that it
outrages the noblest instincts of humanity."
Although originally issued in response to Nazi atrocities, the words of
Pius XII bring great insight to the euthanasia doctrine in general. Pius XII
repeats that only God has the right to take the life of an innocent and while
human suffering should be avoided, the suffering itself may hold special
merit for the sufferer in light of the Redemption."' To accept the
reasoning of Pius XII and John Paul II requires both acceptance of the
natural law and the belief that as humans we do not morally possess the
right to do all that we desire. In this modem world, there is great
resistance against accepting the possibility that there may be. a law or a
law-giver who stands above human law and will.82
The process of dying is often painful and lacking in dignity, peace or
beauty. But it has become part of American culture to pretend these facts
do not exist, and to become angry when made to confront them. Dr.
Sherwin Nuland, a proponent of the right to die, expressed fn his book
of (lying," and
How We Die,that he wrote "to demythologize the process
8' 3
reality.
clinical
and
biological
its
"in
death
to present
Another view is that of Dr. Timothy Quill, advocate for physicianaid-in-dying and the litigant in Quill, who believes that when a patient is
dying, "alleviating suffering becomes more important than prolonging
life.: 4 Here, the views of Dr. Quill and Catholic moral thought are in
agreement, but they separate when Quill, and others who share his view,
fail to advocate for comfort care and instead argue for the right of the
dying patient to end his life. This conduct may be considered
abandonment of the dying in the truest sense of the word because it
encourages the patient's belief that they are no longer wanted or needed
in this world, the very opposite ofrecognizing the dignity of a person's life
and death.

so KELLY, supra note 25, at 2-3.
81 Id. at 3.
2 Id. at5.
13

"

SHmRwiN B. NULAND, How VE DiE: RELCTIONS ON LIFE'S FINAL CHEAPTERxvii (1994).
QUILL, supranote 6, at 36.
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Many supporters of the right to die claim that the dying who seek a
speedy death are not depressed, but merely making rational decisions
about ending their lives. Others, however, point out that if a person who
is not terminally ill seeks to commit suicide, he or she is considered to
have a mental or emotional illness and precautions are taken to prevent a
suicide. In contrast, when a terminally ill patient wants to end his life,
people line up in readiness to assist.8 5 This is due again to a belief in the
qualitative value of life. As stated by the Quill court, "Surely, the state's
interest [in protecting life] lessens as the potential for life diminishes. "' s
Nondisabled persons seeing the life of a disabled patient might assess
that were they deprived of their physical abilities they would want to end
their own lives, and thus "might come to view the right to die as a social
program in the best interests of those who are disabled."1 Instead, a
request for suicide should be seen as a plea for help - in the form of pain
management and human comfort and society., It has been established
that most terminal patients can be relieved from pain, provided their
physicians are committed to the process." Once the pain is diminished
and the patient feels connected to his community, there is generally little
discussion about euthanasia 0
CONCLUSION
Borrowing from its opponents, the VaticanDeclarationon Euthanasiaof
the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith identifies the "right to
die" as a "right to die peacefully with human and Christian dignity," and
not the right to procure the death of self or of others. 9 ' This dignity

I Chopko, supra note 76, at 531; Stanley S. Herr, et al., No Place To Go: Refusal ofLffeSustainingTreatmentby Competent Personswith PlosicalDisabilities,S ISSUES RIL. & M.
23 (1992-93).
z Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d. 716,729 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted,117 S.Ct. 36 (1996).
s' Stanley S. Herr et a!., No PlaceTo Go: Refsal ofLifc-Sustaining Treatment by Comp tent
Personswith PysicalDisabilities,8 ISSUES INL. &MED. 23, 32 (1992).
' As seen in both Compassion In Dying v. Washington and Quillv. Vacco, all patient-plaintiflf
stated that their pain was uncontrollable and unbearable.
s Amicus Briet United States Catholic Conference, CompassionIn Dying, at 25.
RAmSEY, supra note 33, at 152 (quoting Cicely Saunders, M.D., leeder in the hospice
movement in Great Britain).
91 SACRED CONGREGATIONFORTHED0cINEOFTmEFAITH, supranote 1, at321.
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persists even inthe face of enormous pain that can "turn us outward,
enabling our capacity to respond with a compassionate presence to the
bodily and psychic afflictions of others."' 9
In contrast, the "appeal for legalized euthanasia seerms thus to reflect
a flight from compassion rather than an expression of compassion." 93
True compassion, in the care of the dying, requires great strength of
character, because the sight of the suffering of others is difflcuit to endure.
As Leon R. Kass, author of DEATH WITH DIGNiTY AND THE SNCTiTY OF
LIFE explained, "Above all, we must not allow ourselves to become self
deceived: We must never seek to relieve our own frustrations and
bitterness over the lingering deaths of others by pretending that.we can kill
them to sustain their dignity."' 9
Compassion and dignity require that in the face of unbearable
suffering, we respond to the call to affirm life to the dying person. This
does not mean that we demand the dying to hold onto life at all costs, but
merely to recognize there is dignity and sanctity in each moment of life as
well as through the moment of death, which must be allowed to arrive at
its own natural time. Dignity at death means being given a hand to hold
and having care that maintains control over pain, rather than being pushed
into a premature and unnatural death.
Because the right to die has now been established as a
Constitutionally-protected right by at least two federal appellate courts, its
development, use, and operation will occupy the court and legislatures
who have once again been called upon to establish national morals. The
moral theology of the Catholic Church should be welcomed into this
public debate and should be permitted to influence, shape and contribute
to formulation of the law alongside other theories and philosophies, both
secular and spiritual.
Uniformity in terminology must also be injected into the debate.
Intent, a concept so critical in American criminal and civil law definitions,
must be acknowledged in the unfolding of this new right to die.

' Courtney S. Campbell, Principleisr andReligion - The Law and The Prophet., in AMATrM
OF PRINCiPLES 203 (E.
DuBose ed., 1994).
93 J
I Leon R. Kass, Deathwith Dignity and the Sanctity ofLife, in ATIMETO BBORNANDA
TIMETo DIE 140 (B. Kogan ed., 1991).
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Euthanasia, a term which both the Second and Ninth Circuits refused to
acknowledge, must be used to describe what these courts approved - the
intentional killing of person at that person's request. Calling this process
"physician-assisted suicide" or some other term designed to ease the
consciences of the litigants, attorneys, and judges, does not disguise what
the courts have in fact approved. The challenge for the United States
Supreme Court now, is to undo the damage caused by CompassionIn
Dying and Quill and to return the work of the court to its traditional
function, by supporting the preservation of life.
In view ofthe currenttrend to accept, allow and encourage euthanasia,
opponents are struggling to re-focus discussion on the sanctity of life, and
to reveal euthanasia not as the merciful, dignified ending it announces
itself to be, but as the killing of a person in direct opposition to any respect
for life. In this argument, religious views can be of significance, even if
they are not identified specifically as "religious." For example, the
concept of a consistent ethic of life, expounded by the late Cardinal
Bernardin, can be used to challenge proponents of euthanasia and does not
require acceptance of Roman Catholic doctrine to speak to its validity. 5
As world leaders struggle to honor the sanctity oflife, the Catholic Church
is in the unique position of offering the world its long-held and wellarticulated beliefs why euthanasia is wrong, thereby bringing theology
into public debate in a meaningful way.

I- Campbell, supranote 92, at206.

